The Qur’anic text, although
it is the Word of God protected from corruption and human interference,
is expressed in human language which is the Arabic used at the time of
revelation of Qur’an by the Arabs1.
Despite its miraculous clarity2,
its message could be, and has been, misunderstood by readers on many occasions,
in spite of their good intentions because of their human limitations. There
was an indisputable solution to the problem of interpretation of Qur’an
in the person of the Prophet (sws) so long as he was alive. He clarified
all misunderstandings about the message of the Qur’an and Sunnah
and gave unquestionable verdicts on disputes arising in that connection.
Indeed, as mentioned earlier, it was an important part of his Prophetic
obligation to clarify the message of the Qur’an. With his demise,
that important privilege was lost to the Muslims. Ever since, Muslim scholars
have been unable to agree on many, if not most, of the important issues
of Islamic jurisprudence. These differences are neither surprising nor
regrettable. In the absence of a general agreement, however, it is vital
to decide clearly how to deal with them individually as well as collectively.
But before that, a word about the significance of these differences.
Anyone familiar with the work done
on the Islamic Shari‘ah in the last fourteen hundred years will
not hesitate to agree that juristic differences amongst Muslims scholars
are a general rule rather than an exception. The four famous schools of
Islamic jurisprudence are named after the illustrious jurists who were
the originators of their respective schools of thought. Although they all
acknowledge that the Qur’an is the first source of the Islamic Shari‘ah
followed by the Sunnah of the Prophet (sws), there are still
considerable differences in the principles they have derived from these
original sources. Amongst these schools, the Hanafites rely mainly on analogy
(Qiyas) and social utility (Istihsan). To the Malikites,
an authentic Hadith from the Prophet’s companions is more reliable
than Qiyas. Moreover, to them, of all the reports about the practice
of the Prophet (sws), the more reliable are those which are in compliance
with the customs and traditions of the inhabitants of Madinah, the
Prophet’s city. The Shafites acknowledge the superiority of Ijma‘ (consensus)
over a Hadith transmitted only by a few persons or not confirmed
by several narrators. The Hanbalites’ approach is not very different from
the Shafites’ except that in their view authentic Hadith is superior
to Qiyas, Ijma‘ or the Prophet’s companion’s own interpretation.
Moreover, a part of the differences among these schools of jurisprudence
are attributable to the fact that they represent attempts to interpret
the Shari‘ah under different set of circumstances.
The reason why the number of juristic scholars is not
larger than it could be can only be attributed to the tendency of unquestioned
acquiescence to a certain school of thought (Taqli#d) among a large number
of latter-day scholars. Since directly accessing the original sources began
to be considered a prerogative of the earlier scholars, many of the later
doctors of Islamic law faithfully confined themselves to the task of applying
the principles of their predecessors to contemporary issues. A few exceptions
apart, the process has continued until now. Nevertheless, the differences
in the first two centuries of the Muslim calendar had already assumed such
proportions that it can rightfully be claimed that hardly any important
area of Islamic law has remained unaffected.
Now the problem arises that an individual
is bound to confront difficulties in choosing one point of view from amongst
a number of those available in his attempt to follow the Qur’an and
Sunnah. How can he achieve that objective given the differences
on various issues?
There can be no one answer for all
people. For religious scholars who have the ability to understand the original
sources properly, the only way to follow the Shari‘ah is to follow
it in accordance with their own understanding of it. Those who do not possess
that ability but can still appreciate the relative strengths of the contesting
arguments, the opinion appearing to be the most convincing should be the
one they should follow, even though that might result in accepting verdicts
of different scholars on different matters. Scholars too will have to adopt
this strategy in the areas they have not researched as yet. If there are
individuals who are unable to find out clearly the most strongly supported
case, they may then accept the opinion of the scholar who enjoys their
confidence more because of his good character and sound knowledge.
Taqlid, despite being the predominant
way of deciding about a religious verdict amongst a large number of the
present-day Muslims, cannot be justified from the teachings of the Qur’an
and Sunnah. First, because it implies that those following this
approach have taken a decision not to use their own intellectual abilities.
That is clearly against Qur’an3.
Second, because it has to be assumed by those adopting this approach that
the scholar they have chosen to follow is fault-free. There is none, according
to the Qur’an, who is, apart from the Prophets, divinely guided
and, therefore, fault-free.4
Third, Qur’an itself condemns the approach of those who choose to
follow others instead of using their own intellect in religious matters.5
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